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Abstract
During the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and VladimirPutin, the
governments of Russia and the United States could not agreeon how to codify their balance
of strategic offensive nuclear forces after the existing Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
(START) expired onDecember 5, 2009.1 The United States and Russia are currently
engagedin negotiations to replace START with a new treaty before the end of this year.
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START: Overcoming Remaining
Challenges
By Elizabeth Zolotukhina

Introduction
During the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir
Putin, the governments of Russia and the United States could not agree
on how to codify their balance of strategic offensive nuclear forces after
the existing Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) expired on
December 5, 2009.1 The United States and Russia are currently engaged
in negotiations to replace START with a new treaty before the end of this
year.
Then U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed START on July 31, 1991, after a decade of contentious
negotiations and only months before the USSR's disintegration. The
accord required both countries to decrease their strategic holdings to
6,000 nuclear warheads on a maximum of 1,600 strategic delivery systems (land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles or long-range bombers) by
December 5, 2001. START did not come into force until December 5,
1994, after the parties agreed that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and
Ukraine would serve as legal successors to the Soviet Union for the purposes of the treaty. START's initial duration was set to fifteen years, but
the parties could agree to its extension for successive five-year periods.
Each side also has the right to withdraw from the treaty by giving the
other party six months notice. Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin
negotiated a START II treaty that would have required deeper reductions,
but the Russian Duma and the U.S. Congress failed to agree on
mutually-acceptable terms of ratification.
Strategic delivery systems for both countries include the three main components of the traditional nuclear triad—land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),
and long-range heavy bombers. All three systems are capable of attacking
targets at great distances (over 5,000 kilometers), allowing a delivery
platform based in Russia to reach the United States and vice-versa.
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The Quest for Strategic Flexibility
Bush administration officials valued strategic flexibility to adjust the U.S.
nuclear arsenal rapidly to meet unanticipated strategic challenges as well
as to avail of technological opportunities. They considered comprehensive
strategic arms control treaties largely irrelevant in a world in which
threats from transnational terrorists and states of proliferation concern
had become more important than fears of a confrontation between Moscow and Washington. Instead, they relied upon other measures such as
export controls, interdiction, and sanctions to ensure international security. However, American officials did not entirely repudiate traditional
arms control measures. Administration representatives argued that the
implementation of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or
Moscow Treaty), signed in May 2002, would suffice to place the U.S.Russian bilateral strategic arms control relationship on a stable basis
despite complications arising from the treaty's lack of verification measures and other ambiguities associated with the two-page document.

U.S. Policy to Date
During the 2008 presidential campaign, then-Senator Barack Obama
promised to pursue negotiations to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear force
levels. This policy was tested immediately following Obama's inauguration when Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made his November 5th
threat to target countries in northeast Europe with Iskander short-range
missiles if Washington did not scrap the ballistic missile defense (BMD)
deployments planned for Poland and the Czech Republic.2 Upon assuming office, President Obama directed a "reset" of bilateral relations, spearheaded by the U.S. Department of State. This comprehensive
re-positioning of Washington's Russia policy—which administration officials also expect will involve major changes in Russia's foreign and
defense policies—is envisaged to include renewed attention to arms control issues; specifically, the negotiation of an accord to replace the START
treaty. Official talks to this end began on April 24, 2009.
The opening of the negotiations for START followed a very positive reception to President Barack Obama's Prague speech earlier that month reaffirming the U.S. commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, which
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have both endorsed. UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the "new momentum for disarmament"3 represented by the start of the Russia-America talks. The two
governments are aiming to sign a replacement accord this Fall. This
would allow legislative bodies in both countries to examine and ratify the
26
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new text by December 2009. However, it is far from certain whether the
parties will be able to overcome the major arms control differences separating them by the December deadline; nevertheless, Presidents Obama
and Medvedev had high hopes to finalize the treaty text during a July
2009 meeting in Moscow.
White House officials hailed the July 6–8, 2009 Russian-American summit as an overall success, pointing to the numerous agreements reached
while conceding that it would be impossible to "solve everything in two
days."4 Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed several documents at the
meeting, including a joint understanding that commits the United States
and Russia to reduce their strategic warheads to a range of 1500–1675
and their strategic delivery vehicles to a range of 500–1100.5 Moscow and
Washington would be required to meet these limits within seven years
after the new treaty enters into force. The two leaders also agreed to
resume military contacts suspended after the August 2008 Georgia war,
reached a deal allowing coalition forces to transport lethal equipment and
troops bound for Afghanistan through Russian territory and airspace,6
and committed to jointly analyzing "ballistic missile challenges of the 21st
century,"7 and to intensify their dialogue regarding the establishment of
the Joint Data Exchange Center for missile launches.
Many issues continue to divide the two sides and these issues may preclude, or at least hinder, the conclusion of an agreement to replace
START. For example, Obama and Medvedev disagree regarding Russia's
recent dismemberment of Georgia and, more broadly, Moscow's policies
towards countries it considers as its "near abroad," such as Ukraine and
the Central Asian states. In addition, the presidents were unable to reach
consensus regarding the proposed deployment of U.S. BMD components
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although the U.S. administration has
not yet made a policy decision on this issue, President Obama declined to
link the BMD system with the current START negotiations—the preferred
position of his Russian interlocutors.

The Russian Angle
Russian negotiators are pushing for a new, formal treaty that would
replace START and supersede SORT.8 The Kremlin wants the new accord
to be legally binding and more detailed than SORT, which it perceives as
insufficiently constraining to ensure predictability and parity in the Russian-American strategic nuclear relationship. For example, Moscow
favors firm limits on the number of U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles, as well as restrictions on their possible long-term deployment in
27

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

foreign countries (e.g., to exclude the deployment of U.S. strategic bombers in former Soviet bloc countries near Russia). They also want to be able
to increase the number of warheads aboard some Russian missiles, have
fewer limitations on the movements of their existing nuclear forces (e.g.,
Russia's road-mobile Topol-Ms), and enjoy greater freedom to modernize
their nuclear forces to ensure their ability to overcome the expanding U.S.
ballistic missile defenses network.9
Russian officials are open to eliminating some of START's more burdensome implementation requirements, if only to reduce the expenses associated with meeting these provisions (especially those associated with the
costly short-notice inspections).10 Russian negotiators and their American counterparts generally support retaining some of the detailed verification and data exchange provisions that have long characterized
strategic arms control agreements rather than adopting the less formal
transparency regime favored by the George W. Bush administration.11 In
addition, Russian representatives would like to require the United States
to eliminate warheads removed from its active stockpile rather than simply placing them in storage, which makes them potentially available for
re-entry into the operational force. Putin and other Russian leaders have
long complained about Washington's policy of placing "aside a couple of
hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day."12

Ongoing Negotiations
The April negotiations which took place at the residence of the U.S.
Ambassador to the United Kingdom in London, although largely symbolic, resulted in the adoption of two declarations and a clarification of
the two sides' initial negotiating positions. The first communiqué
addressed the issue of strategic offensive weapons,13 while the second was
concerned with the general framework of U.S.-Russian relations including various arms control issues and regional security.14
By adopting a bilateral arms control declaration that underscores the
long-term goal of destroying nuclear weapons as a whole, Washington
and Moscow pledged to engage in a gradual process aimed at achieving
new and verifiable reductions of their strategic arsenals. A new
legally-binding agreement will be a part of this paradigm.
One of the most important issues dividing the two parties is which warheads to count. The United States still objects to the Russian proposal to
count warheads that are in storage or are being refurbished. However,
Russian officials have repeatedly voiced concerns that Washington could
quickly "re-upload" these warheads if the occasion arises.15 Russian and
28
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American diplomats must also agree on which prohibitions, restrictions,
and other provisions already present in START, should be included in the
new accord. Moreover, they need to establish the number of warheads
that each side is permitted to retain.
The new agreement will contain a bilateral ceiling of 1500–1675 warheads, only a moderate reduction in the ceiling established by the 2002
Moscow Treaty (2200–1700 warheads). However, once the new treaty is
enacted, U.S. officials intend to open talks to cut arms more deeply.16
Russian military commanders worry that such measures could destabilize
strategic parity between Moscow and Washington and add that any
accord, which reduces the number of allowable warheads below 1500
would have to include provisions for restricting U.S. missile defense. Critics of Obama, who has articulated a broad nonproliferation agenda,
including the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, urge the administration not to conclude a successor agreement to START until the Nuclear
Posture Review, a document which establishes policies and strategies for
the U.S. nuclear deterrent, has been completed and assessed by Congress.
One report argues that it would be "ill advised" to consider cuts below
1700 warheads in a START follow-on agreement due to "the immense
advantage the Kremlin enjoys in nonstrategic weapons and the threat
they pose to the former Soviet republics and American allies on Russia's
littoral."17 Nevertheless, the joint statements adopted by the American
and Russian Presidents in London and Moscow clearly demonstrate that
both sides would like to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons
in the future.

Success not Guaranteed
Although it is difficult to foresee possible solutions to many outstanding
technical issues, in the past, factors external to the agreement have posed
serious obstacles to the conclusion of a strategic arms control accord.
Some observers note that bilateral strategic arms control negotiations further U.S.-Russian relations. However, usually the causality is reversed.
Positive overall ties determine the success of arms control negotiations.
The history of the past several decades shows that rather than using arms
control discussions as a vehicle to improve bilateral ties, oftentimes success in arms control requires good bilateral relations between Moscow
and Washington.
Historically, disruptive external factors included disagreement on other
aspects of arms control as well as unrelated and unconnected international security issues. For example, divergent views on NATO enlarge29
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ment and the Kosovo war led the Russian Duma to postpone ratification
of START II. Likewise, Russia's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan prompted
the U.S. Senate to refuse to ratify SALT II.
Russian and American leaders already have identified other concerns that
could impede START negotiations. These issues encompass missile
defense, mid-range nuclear missiles, short-range tactical nuclear missiles,
conventional military force reductions, and questions regarding the strategic forces of other nuclear states. Geopolitical issues, which have the
potential to derail the strategic weapons negotiations, include further
NATO enlargement, Russian policy toward other former Soviet republics,
especially Georgia and Ukraine, as well as differences between Washington and Moscow regarding Iran.

Policy Prerogatives Moving Forward
The Obama administration has yet to conclude the policy review of U.S.
missile defense. Decisions in this regard partially hinge on the progress of
Iran in developing dual-use nuclear and missile technologies. President
Obama's letter to his Russian counterpart underlined the link between
U.S. missile defense and the Iranian threat.18 In the same missive, Obama
noted that, should international efforts achieve the goal of rolling back
Tehran's attempts to develop missile and nuclear weapons, in which
Washington ascribes an important role to Moscow, the need for an American missile defense system would decline in tandem.
In the best-case scenario, the two governments would cooperate on the
Iranian issue. Initial steps in this regard were taken at the Moscow summit when Presidents Obama and Medvedev pledged to jointly evaluate the
threat posed by Tehran. This approach may help to avert the near-term
danger posed by Tehran developing indigenous nuclear weapons and
establish the basis of a long-term partnership in other nonproliferation
areas.
The focus on nuclear arms control could further the "reset" of American
policy towards Russia. However, history demonstrates that problems in
unrelated spheres of the U.S.-Russian relationship frequently hinder
progress in bilateral arms control negotiations if the former are not
addressed promptly. These disagreements may increase the likelihood
that misunderstandings could inadvertently lead to missed opportunities
for mutually beneficial arms reductions.
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